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ABSTRACT
Understanding human societies requires knowing how they develop gender hierarchies which are
ubiquitous. We test whether a simple agent-based dynamic process could create gender inequality.
Relying on evidence of gendered status concerns, self-construals, and cognitive habits, our model
included a gender difference in how responsive male-like and female-like agents are to others’ opinions
about the level of esteem for someone. We simulate a population who interact in pairs of randomly
selected agents to influence each other about their esteem judgments of self and others. Half the agents
are more influenced by their relative status rank during the interaction than the others. Without prejudice,
stereotypes, segregation, or categorization, our model produces inter-group inequality of self-esteem
and status that is stable, consensual, and exhibits characteristics of glass ceiling effects. Outcomes
are not affected by relative group size. We discuss implications for group orientation to dominance and
individuals’ motivations to exchange.
Introduction
Most large human societies are structured as group-based dominance hierarchies that include gender
inequality, such that men have more status and power than women; these hierarchies sometimes also
include another form of inequality such as those based on ethnicity, citizenship status, race, religion or
sect, social class, economic role1. A fundamental question is how these group hierarchies develop.
Numerous theoretical processes have been proposed to explain the origins of gender inequality, and
they are not mutually exclusive. For example, sexual strategies theory suggests that men will strive to
obtain greater status than other men, and women will select mates with higher status2. Cultural materialism
theory argues that when an ecology makes it easier for men than for women and children to produce food,
men will gain more status than women, compared to ecologies in which there is no gender advantage
in food procurement3. Whenever men can monopolize access to material resources, claims another
materialist theory, men garner higher status than women4,5. Expectation states theory argues that when
some characteristic that is distributed among humans comes to be widely admired (e.g., agency in capitalist
systems), then people who are expected to have that characteristic (e.g., men) will gain prestige and power6.
Similarly, gender role theory argues that stereotypes of men and women derive from the social roles they
occupy, respectively7,8. In turn, people use gender stereotypes to give or exclude people from particular
roles, such as jobs9,10.
All of these theories posit an interplay among individual, group, and societal levels of interactions that
are bidirectional. Further, they suggest on-going history in which aspects of the past (e.g., the distribution
of men and women into roles, the characteristics associated with prestige) influence the present. In other
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words, micro-processes that occur between individuals produce or reproduce gender-based inequality.
This suggests that the development of gender (and other group-based) inequality can be modelled as a
dynamic system, wherein multiple actors potentially influence all the others, and may produce large-scale
outcomes that no one necessarily intended.
In fact, Social Dominance Theory (SDT) postulates that group-based dominance hierarchies are
complex dynamic systems that must be understood by considering the relationships between different
levels of analysis, from individuals to families to groups to societies and beyond11. SDT specifies how
processes at one level of analysis influence processes at other levels. For example, people who favor
group dominance support political actors, practices, and institutional policies that favor dominant groups12.
institutions tend to select and promote individuals whose values and psychological orientations concur
with the institution’s role in sustaining or mitigating group hierarchy13,14. Robustly across nations, people
in dominant groups favor group dominance more than people in subordinated groups do15. In fact, the
gender difference in favoring general group dominance, called social dominance orientation, is larger in
more individualistic and egalitarian societies in which those values are salient15. Societies have feedback
loops, then, reinforcing the way individuals relate to one another directly, and through their cultural ideals
and institutions16. The kinds of empirical studies cited show pieces of the dynamic system, but only in
brief “film clips” of processes, or “snapshots” of them. Research that tests dynamics in action across
different scales is still needed.
The present research is the first dynamic test of how gender inequality might develop considering that
there is no initial gender discrimination. Clearly there is nothing inherently superior or inferior about
either women or men, so our model is not based on different abilities or survival advantages. Nonetheless,
the way women and men are socialized and the roles they play provide some different learning experiences.
To be parsimonious, we attempted to identify just one feature that could differ between simulated men and
women that could produce gender inequality because of how individuals interact with one another.
We start with a human universal: the most fundamental social problem that all humans face is to belong
to some collective of others17, which is necessary for survival and thriving18. In fact, the sociometer theory
posits that self-esteem is a tool for measuring how well one is accepted by others19,20. We therefore chose
social esteem, both for self and others, as the causal parameter for our model.
Self-esteem can have many sources. One may view oneself as having virtue according to the cultural
worldview of one’s society, e.g.,21. A similar source is identifying as a member of a well-regarded
social group22, 23. These sources of self-esteem hinge on having a socially-embedded (interdependent)
self-concept that unites one’s own identity with other people24. A separate method of obtaining self-esteem
is to compare oneself favorably with others, either privately (social comparison)25 or publicly, using status
displays26,27. These latter methods require differentiating one’s self-concept from that of others, reflecting
a more independent self-concept24. There is the ample evidence that women are more communal than
men, and that obtaining status is more valued by men, and that competing for status is prescribed for
men by stereotypes28,29,30,31. As such, we posit that men care more about others’ status than women do
regarding cues to their own self-esteem.
On that basis, our model considers a population of virtual agents who interact to update how high they
hold others and themselves in esteem. Indeed, to build evidence for this multi-level, dynamic theory, one
must connect studies on humans at one or two levels of social organization together (e.g.16). The dynamic
tenets of SDT, such as historical change, must be tested using modelling (e.g.32), but this has not yet been
done. Likewise, a glass ceiling effect cannot be diagnosed only from a single measure at a given time
because the phenomena is about career trajectories33. For these reasons, we use agent-based modelling to
understand how the status structure of a society with two kinds of agents develops. Agent-based simulation
is an appropriate tool to study complex interactions among people, groups, and society, because it allows
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one to observe the evolution of virtual agents who communicate amongst themselves34,35,36.
Further, we built the hypotheses of our updating function for the evolution of esteems on cognitive
psychology studies. All societies construct categories of gender and the meanings of those identities37. In
individualistic societies, there is a high degree of similarity in gender stereotypes across cultures38,39. Very
early, children learn gender roles40,41, namely the set of norms, cognitive and social behaviors described by
the stereotypes of girls and boys, women and men42,43. The sanctions that children and adults receive for
violating stereotypes of the gender others presume them to have provide disincentives for not conforming,
and so, gender identity can become an important part of people’s self-esteem, especially for men44,30,26,31.
The aspects of socialized gender differences we posit as especially germane to self-esteem are (a) having a
communal, interdependent orientation, or (b) being individualistic and sensitive to one’s status rank with
respect to others45,46,47,48.
Further, there are cognitive gender differences that support our supposition, especially in how men and
women vary in processing information about people.
• women have higher attributional complexity (the degree to which an individual considers multiple
kinds of information regarding someone in deep processing for social judgements) than men do49,50;
• concerning information processing, women (more than men) are concerned of others, have a
lower threshold for message elaboration and extensively use message cues, all indicating they
generally process more messages from others and rely less on heuristics to decide the value of a
message51,52,53,54,55,56,57;
Moreover, according to the Elaboration Likelihood Model of58, people who are less motivated to
elaborate on the message use external cues to decide whether to accept the message. We posit that such a
cue can be the status of the person who conveys the message. As such, one would expect men to rely on
status cues as a heuristic more strongly than women do, when they have to deal with information related
to people.
These differences in how women and men respond to others and judge them are observable in results
from several surveys. For example in Fig. 1 we can observe that in all the European countries, women are
more concerned to treat others equally, and are more open-minded in listening to others, than men are.
Figure 1. Perceived dissimilarity with someone thinking that it is important to listen to people however, for
different sexes and in different countries. Perceived dissimilarity with someone thinking that it is important to treat
people equally. Source: ESS8-2016 data, ed.1.0.
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Uniting this gender difference in information processing with the gender difference in the importance
of social status, we hypothesize that when exchanging information about people with other people:
• women (compared to men) will more influenced by the contents of the message itself, especially by
how it is different from what they already know – and this influence will be less contingent on their
status evaluation of the message-giver than is the case for men;
• status of self and others is salient to men, and so for men, the importance of the message content
depends on how they perceive the message-giver’s status to be relative to their evaluation of their
own status.
We implement these complementary hypotheses using an agent-based simulation that models the
dynamics of interactions between persons (agents) over time, assuming that the population includes two
subsamples who differ in their sensitivity or indifference to self-other status differentials. We assume
these hypotheses are sufficient to explain the genesis and the maintenance of gender inequality. A brief
introduction to the agent-based model and the motivation for our modelling choices will be given in the
Methods section.
The agent-based model is used to examine the development of inequality between “male-like” and
“female-like” agents, who merely differ in their sensitivity to status, and further, to test whether their
interactions produces a status hierarchy, and one theoretical prescribed by SDT in that it is stable, with
men having more status than women. Specifically, SDT has a tenet concerning the disproportionate rank
of individuals in societies as a function of their gender. The “iron law of andrarchy” states that the higher
in rank, authority, power, or status an individual is, the less likely that individual is to be a woman1. One
version of this disproportionality, discovered independently, is the “Glass Ceiling,” the institutional barriers
present even in supposedly non-discriminatory settings, that prevent most members of subordinated groups
such as women, racial minorities or working-class people, from rising to the upper rungs of the institutional
hierarchy, regardless of their qualifications or achievements. This concept was popularized in a prominent
Wall Street Journal article by Carol Hymowitz and Timothy D. Schellhardt, in 1986, entitled: "The Glass
Ceiling: Why Women Can’t Seem to Break the Invisible Barrier That Blocks Them From the Top Jobs."
For recent empirical evidence of glass ceilings, see59,60,61. A related phenomenon is the persistence of
salary and wage gaps that favor men over time. Longitudinal studies on labour data have documented this
effect in several countries62,63,64.
To sum-up, starting from the large literature on gender differences, our agent-based model assumes
that women are more open to listening to others’ opinions than men are, whereas men more consider the
relative status of others in determining how much to take the other’s views seriously with respect to social
esteem.
Results of simulations
This section shows that our agent-based model produces an emergent intergroup inequality that has the
form of a glass ceiling inequality and that is not related to minority/majority effects. The indicators and
the methods for their analysis are detailed in the Method section.
The emergence and the persistence of inter-group inequality
To better measure the effects on the dynamic interactions of two sets of agents, we compare the outcome
of our model with a baseline simulation that has the same number of agents, but in which all the agents
have the same open-mindedness levels as that of the lower-level group in our model. The black line in
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Fig. 2, which represents the baseline model, show that different values of the open–mindedness parameter
σS produce different average group reputation (i.e. average of esteems for the members of a group) and
average agent self-esteem. These baseline plots are a summary of the model analysis presented in65. The
fact that both the average reputation and average self-esteem are negative is due to the model settings
about the gossip dynamics in the interactions66.
Figure 2. Upper plot: average group reputation for different values of σS. Lower left plot: average self-esteem of
the groups for different values of σS. Lower right plot: Intra-group variability - variation coefficient for different
values of σS. The black baseline represents a single group with open–mindedness parameter σS. In the other cases
the population is divided into two equal-size groups with open–mindedness parameter σS (blue lines) and
σL = f (σS) (magenta lines). The empty symbols correspond to the function: σL = σS+0.1 the others to the case
σL = 1.5xsigmaS
.
Comparing the two-group model with the baseline model, we immediately observe a differentiation
of the two groups’ behaviors: the reputation of the group with lower open–mindedness (the S–group)
is always above the baseline (see the upper plot of Fig. 2). The lower open—mindedness (“male-like”)
group, on average, gains large advantages by interacting with the rest of the population.
Moreover, the average reputation of the S–group is not only higher than agents’ in the baseline model,
but also higher than the average reputation of the higher open–mindedness (“female-like”) group (the
L–Group). We can therefore conclude that this status-formation process, where the two sets of agents
become differentiated in their reputations (public status) due only to their initial levels of open–mindedness,
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generates a dominant group with an average status reputation higher than the second, disfavoured, but
more open-minded group. One could describe the result, alternatively, as showing that responding more to
those equal or superior in status to oneself results in attaining higher status.
The same results just described for reputation are also apparent for self-esteem; in the left lower plot
of Fig. 2 we see that the less open–minded group exhibits higher self-esteem on average than both the
baseline model and than the other group.
The emergence of differences in intragroup stratification
Finally, we analyze intra-group inequality in reputation, using the reputation variation coefficient. The
right lower plot of Fig. 2) shows that the dominant (less open–minded) group displays higher variability
among those agents’ reputations than the variability in the other group. In other words, in addition to
developing inter-group inequality in consensual reputations and in own self-esteem favoring the less
open-minded group, the model also creates much stronger intragroup stratification in reputations of agents
in the more dominant group, with very little status differentiation among the more open-minded group.
Note that none of the group difference effects shown in Fig. 2) change as a result of the level of lower
open–mindedness parameter (σL = f (σS)).
Replication of the dynamics of glass ceiling
Delving into the stratification process, we will now show that the model’s dynamic system, in addition to
developing the group differences in self-esteem, status reputation, and level of stratification in reputation
already shown, produces status inequality that has the same static and dynamic characteristics of the glass
ceiling, as defined by67.
The first criterion given by67 is: A glass ceiling inequality represents a gender or racial difference that
is not explained by other job-relevant characteristics of the employee. In our agent-based model, agents
have no job-relevant (or any other kind of) characteristics; they only differ by their open-mindedness or
degree of insensitivity, assuming this is a cultural characteristic of their group (however defined: gender,
race, etc.). Our model consistently produces two sets of agents with unequal reputations, where the less
open-minded group becomes superior, a result that cannot be attributed to any job-relevant (or other
agent-relevant) characteristic. This result is shown in Fig. 3A, which depicts boxplots for the rankings of
both groups, varying over a range of the more open group’s open-mindedness levels. In Figure 3A, the
group S with lower open–mindedness, alway occupies the higher status rank positions (scale with 1 being
the highest rank, 40 the lowest), regardless of the level of the associated parameter σS.
The second criterion given by67 is: A glass ceiling inequality represents a gender or racial difference
that is greater at higher levels of an outcome than at lower levels of an outcome. Our model would
reflect the second criteria if the frequency of the lower-reputation group agents (the group with higher
open–mindedness, L−Group) decreases as the social rank improves (indicated by low order of prestige).
Fig. 3B shows that the probability that a rank is occupied by an agent of the L(S)−Group, declines
markedly among the highest social rank positions, which of course are occupied by Group S. This is not
a linear function, however. Rather, there is a “glass ceiling” around rank 12 above which no agents of
Group L rise, indicated with the arrow in Fig. 3B. Just below the elite ranks (about 1 to 12), there is a
near-even chance those positions are occupied by Group L or Group S agents, as if a few women can
have higher-than average rank, but still not rise to the very top. However, the entire bottom half of the
social ranks (21 to 40) is more likely to be occupied by agents of the more open-minded than the more
closed-minded group. Notice that the result is stable for all the values of the open–mindedness parameter
σS.
The third and the fourth criteria given by67 are: A glass ceiling inequality represents a gender or racial
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Figure 3. Group S (in magenta) is less open-minded than Group L (in blue), and then occupies on average higher
ranks (1 is the best rank). Plot A: Boxplot of status rank values for different populations having different values of
the open–mindedness parameter σS for the group S, and the corresponding value of (σL = 1.5 x σS) for the group L.
Dashed lines indicate group means for the lowest σS 0.05, across levels of σS: we observe the difference of average
ranking for group S and group L increases with the value of σS. Plot B: Probability for a rank to be occupied by an
agent in a group at each level of the open-mindedness parameters (see legend, still with σL = 1.5 x σS). Plot C:
Probability of moving to a lower status position (higher in rank) given the agent’s initial rank, by group and
open-mindedness parameter. The three plots represent averages computed from 100 replicas of each tested
parameter set.
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inequality in the chances of advancement into higher levels, not merely the proportions of each gender or
race currently at those higher levels and A glass ceiling inequality represents a gender or racial inequality
that increases over the course of a career.
Evidence for these criteria in our model would not just be shown by the probability of each group at
each rank, as shown in Fig. 3B, but by observing that the probability for agents of the lower-prestige group
to move to a higher rank is smaller than the probability that agents of the higher rank do. In other words, if
our model produces a glass ceiling, not only should disfavoured group agents should be less numerous
in higher ranks at a given time point, but also, when agents change rank in time, the disfavoured group
(L−Group) should have a lower chance, compared to agents of the dominant group, to reach a higher
rank.
This dynamical pattern is reproduced by our model. It is shown in Fig. 3C, where we compare
the probability of obtaining a higher status at time t + 1 starting from an initial position at time t:
P(Rank(t+1)≤ Rank(t)|Rank(t)). We see that agents’ progression to higher ranks is less probable for
the more open—minded, lower status group, especially in the higher positions.
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Figure 4. Z-scores, indicating how different from the expected probability from the fraction of L in the
population, is the probability of the more open-minded Group L being in the 5 most prestigious ranks (green points,
lower than the expected z-score 0) and of being in the 5 least prestigious ranks (orange points, higher from the
expected z-score 0) plotted by their proportion of the population of agents. Each small point represents a simulation
setup replicated 50 times, varying the combined values of (σS, (σL, k) - see the method section for details.
Group size does not change the basic inequality patterns
In the previous paragraphs we considered a population equally partitioned in the two groups of 20 agents
each. We now investigate whether the relative size of the groups can change the stratification patterns
previously observed (still with a total population of 40 agents). We elaborate a large experimental design
described with more details in the method section. We vary by step of 5% the fraction of L in the population.
For each fraction, we varied values of σS and σL, as well as the level of gossip through the parameter k over
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a large range. Overall, we ran 405 various parameter sets replicated 30 times each. Considering the results
of each set of experiments obtained for each fractional value of L, we compute the Z-score indicating how
the results vary from the expected value computed from the fraction of L. Indeed, in an ideal case, where
no inequality is present, the expected presence of the disfavoured group L in the top 5 and bottom 5 ranks
should be proportional to their relative size in the population: Pexptop5 = P
exp
bottom5 =∼ NL/N. Therefore, in
Fig. 4 we should observe all the points distributed around the dotted black line 0. On the contrary we
observe that, for all values of the simulation parameters, and for all the values of the relative group size,
the presence of L-Group’s (female-like) agents in the top 5 ranks is lower than chance, but higher than
chance in the bottom 5 ranks.
This result shows that the mechanism of stratification due to behavioral difference in our model is
valid not only for equal sized groups, but also for populations with minorities.
Discussion
This paper presents an extremely parsimonious but rich experiment to test one simple hypothesis of the
genesis and development of gender inequality. Drawing on the basic need to belong, aspects of gender
socialization regarding self and others, and cognitive gender differences, our model posited one gendered
behavior concerning listening and information-processing, namely, that men’s estimations of self and
others would depend on the others’ relative status rank more than women’s would, because women respond
to other’s messages more, with less regard for the status of the other. The model represents this difference
solely as the value of the open-mindedness parameter for each set of agents. We showed that this cognitive
behavioral difference generates inter-group status inequalities and additional features of status inequalities
that are often found in human societies.
The model evolution shows that:
• The average reputation of male-like (more status-conscious) agents is generally higher than the
average reputation of female-like (more open-minded) agents. Thus, the model replicated the near-
universal finding that men have higher public prestige than women do across cultures, according to
anthropologists68,69, and to lay people38,39,70. Further, like the many studies that show that there
is a high degree of consensus between men and women that men have higher status71, our model
showed that male-like and female-like agents were in accord as to which of the agents had higher
and lower reputations.
• The average self-esteem of male-like agents is higher than the average self-esteem of female-like
agents. This replicates several empirical studies comparing women and men, especially72;
• There is more status differentiation among the more status-conscious, male-like agents, than among
the more open-minded agents, which replicates the broad finding that most human societies, most
public status-ranking occurs among men68,69.
• When male-like and female-like agents interact, the male-like agents’ reputations increase, but the
female-like agents’ reputations decrease. This “gender” differentiation as a function of interactions
among agents parallels the finding that people tend to emphasize their gender-stereotypic features
when they interact in a mixed-gender context73. In fact, prescribed gender roles suggest that women
should be modest, whereas men can be proud and arrogant31. People’s genders are more salient to
them in mixed-gender settings74.
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• Female-like agents are more subject to peer influence than male-like agents are because female-like
agents have lower average self-esteems. This is in accordance with data on humans75 and76.
• Glass ceiling67: the highest ranked positions are rarely reached by female-like agents, and the
chances that a female-like agent advances her status rank in the future is smaller than the chance of
status rank advancement for male-like agents.
We can conclude that the present simple initial group difference in open-mindedness converges on a
somewhat consensual status-system in which the more open, female-like agents develop lower self-esteem
and lower standing and prestige in the eyes of other agents, while the male-like agents develop higher
self-esteem, more status differentiation among them, as suits their “concern” with status, and lower regard
for female-like agents.
In addition to the parallels between our model‘s results and empirical findings concerning gender
status inequality mentioned above, the present results have a number of implications for theories of gender
inequality and other theories of group-based inequality.
Our model had no separate gender roles, no initial difference in gendered status, no kind of gender
discrimination or prejudice, no family obligations, no stereotypes, no authorities, no violence, no division
of labor, no patriarchal religion, no accumulative economy, and no inheritance or marriage systems, all of
are known to contribute to gender inequality5,77,68,78,69,79. Yet the results showed patterns that mimic real
gender inequality in several details: The model never produced a “societal structure” in which the more
open-minded (“female-like”) agents had higher self-esteem nor higher prestige than the more close-minded
(“male-like”) agents. The gender inequality in self-esteem finding reflects robust empirical findings72 as
does the gender inequality in public prestige68. The model showed that even when any more open-minded
agents attained above-average ranks, there was a structural barrier above which nearly none of them ever
attained the top few ranks. This glass ceiling effect67 reflects nearly every contemporary society, where
some women can become “middle managers” or attain authority roles (where they will be a minority), but
where women in as chief executives in business80,81, government, religious institutions82,83,84, educational
institutions85,86,87, or are the leading intellectuals or artists, are singular exceptions88,89,90. The model
also showed that for the bottom half of the prestige structure, a relatively small, 60% or so, majority of
agents were “female-like”. The association of gender with prestige rank is precisely what makes gender a
status-characteristic91,92,6.
Further, the model showed that the stratification among male-like agents was much stronger than the
stratification among female-like agents. This finding mimics the fact that status does differentiate men
more than it does women in many societies29,93. The insight our model provides to findings that men
are more competitive and want to pursue public status more than women do on average27,26 is that the
Leviathan process itself, with agents who differ in their open-mindedness to being influenced is sufficient
to produce this effect. As with any experiment, ours cannot prove that the process the experiment showed
evidence for what occurs outside the experiment, but our results do provide an extremely parsimonious
process by which the real-world gendered phenomena occur.
The fact that our experiment reproduced these four findings about gender inequality and stratification
raises the question about whether alternative theories about gender inequality and stratification are incorrect
or unnecessary. We would argue against the idea that our model renders gender theories unnecessary for
several reasons. First, models are but one research tool, and as with any experiment, our model serves as
an existence proof of a process that can account for “naturally” (or socially) observed phenomena. No
experiment can prove that the process that occurs within the experiment is the process observed outside
the experiment. Second, we derived the causal parameter of the model based on empirical research on
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humans. The progress of science entails an ongoing dialogue among results from several research methods,
in the present case, where empirical research on humans informs the model, and then, how the model may
inform theories about humans.
So let us turn to the question of where our model fits with respect to theories of gender inequality
on humans. The first point is that our model examined a “micro” set of processes over time, that is,
solely concerning interactions among agents, who can be thought of as individual persons, yet it produced
realistic “societal” patterns without any goals or intentions about those patterns in the agents themselves.
In other words, processes at one level of social organization can indeed produce effects at a higher level
of social organization, as SDT (Social Dominance Theory) holds. This demonstrates that one does not
need to assume that any particular person intends for a societal outcome, or even anticipate the outcome
that their actions help to produce. Considering SDT in particular, substantial evidence shows that people
who are higher rather than lower on social dominance orientation do in fact reinforce and even strengthen
group-based inequality, by selecting roles in institutions that serve those ends,94 for example. There is
also evidence that people higher on social dominance orientation tend to believe that the social world is a
zero-sum game for social status. That is, they believe that if one does not gain superior status, they will
become inferior. Potentially, one of the motivations for the many of the actions higher SDO people that
do maintain group-based hierarchy is simply to show others that they understand the hierarchy and are
following its norms. Showing that one knows one’s cultures norms and conforming to them is a universal
way of ensuring acceptance by others. Alternatively or in addition, higher SDO people may be motivated
to attain higher status, and perhaps also to ensure that that status means something because they do in fact
belong to the highest groups in group-based status hierarchies. This interpretation is consistent with there
facts: (a) SDO among higher-status groups is positively associated with their differentially identifying
with high- but not low-status groups95, (b) SDO has a mild association with status-striving12, and (c) SDO
is higher among higher-status than lower-status groups15. The fact that our model was based on a single
motivation and micro-processes stimulates generating micro-processes related to SDO other than that they
want specifically to maintain a group-based dominance society. They confirm, also, that the very existence
of individual and group variation on SDO cannot account for the existence of group-based dominance
hierarchies11.
In fact, it may be useful to consider our model as representing a micro-process that is part of a broader
context, ones we may have replicated, but did neither measure nor manipulate. For example, regarding our
finding of greater status reputation stratification among the male-like than the female-like agents, we can
consider additional reasons for the difference between the agents’ status sensitivity. Certainly some aspect
of gender role socialization leads to the difference in open-mindedness we modelled, and there are many
processes that could produce the modelled difference. At least in capitalist and individualist cultures, boys
are born into a society where competitiveness among boys, and the stratification among men means that
they could either do well or do very poorly. To survive these difficult contexts for maintaining positive
self-esteem96, males may protect themselves by disregarding anyone’s opinion of them which is lower than
their self-esteem (the Leviathan process), and attend only to the opinions of those they “have to” – namely
higher status people. Further, as members of both sexes observe that males have higher status than females,
all of them learn the gendered status structure, but for males, endorsing that hierarchy (and hostile sexism)
is linked to their striving for positive self-esteem. Men may seek higher-prestige occupations than women
do due not just to fulfill gender role stereotypes, but to have another basis for demonstrating their status
value,97 namely, having a high-status occupation2,77. In fact, a number of theories of the relation between
sexism and masculinity argue that self-motivations are involved44,96, and those self-motivations make men
especially aggressive against women96,98,99 and endorse sexism and sexist political parties100,101.
Finally, one point related to the model has to be pointed out. Our groups, composed of agents having a
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different open–mindedness, communicate with each other intensively: indeed an agent from one group
has the same probability to communicate with an agent from its group than an agent from another group.
We know such an hypothesis is far from the reality since prejudiced people avoid intergroup contact102.
Then the next step for this research is to study different protocols of communications between groups,
particularly to see the impact of different communication patterns on the inequality.
Method
In this section, we present at first an overview of the mechanism for status construction of the model.
Then, we describe in more details the dynamics of the evolution of agents of our study. The following
subsections present the experimental designs realised to obtain our present results, as well as the indicators
extracted from the measures of the simulated dynamics, and how they have been analyzed.
The last subsection makes a short review of the previous studies of the macro behaviours emerging
from this model, and explains how the results of the present study can be explained from the agent-based
model point of view.
The social mechanisms for status construction in the agent-based model
A person’s status is the relative prestige accorded to the person in a society. From the dynamical point
of view, status stratification can be described as the emergent (static or dynamical) equilibrium of a
system of exchanges among the actors about themselves and others. A large literature indicates that these
status stratification processes could be a priori connected to cumulative advantage mechanisms103,104 -
also defined as Matthew effects or Matilda effect105. The effect of cumulative advantage as generative
mechanism of status stratification has been analyzed in several papers106,107. This has been combined
with deference exchange mechanisms in prior modelling research in108.
Differently from such research, the Leviathan model, presented by109, implements a less explicit form
of the Matthew effect cumulative advantage process. Leviathan presumes that actors may not be aware
of the consensual status of their peers, but can, however, compare their own self-esteem with the esteem
they have for each peer. We will use the framework of the Leviathan model109, and more especially its
simplified version65 to study the evolution of the statuses of the actors, assigning to each actor one of the
two cognitive traits described above that are associated with gender.
The Leviathan computer model considers a population of virtual agents, each of whom has an esteem
about each of the agents (including itself). These esteems change, for each agent, via random dyadic
encounters during which two agents “talk” about each other - and also “gossip” about other agents. The
influence mechanism resulting from these encounters can change each agent’s self-esteem and each agent’s
esteem of the others. To be realistic, their communication is not perfect: a noise parameter slightly and
randomly changes what is “said” compared to what is “heard.” Initially, all agents hold neutral estimations
of themselves and each other agent.
In human research on opinion influence, there are two main social comparison factors. One is
similarity between the agents, or homophily110,111,112,113 (see114,115 for a review), in which one’s influence
on another increases with similarity to the other. The other factor that increases influence, which is
employed in the Leviathan model, is the superiority of the speaker as perceived by the listener. This factor
complements homophily effects because a large body of work finds that influence is largely based on the
credibility of the source116,117,118.
To be specific, in our model, the influence function is a classical smooth threshold function119,120
of the difference between the listener’s self-esteem and her esteem about the speaker. This difference
can be viewed as the agent’s perceived relative status. The smoothness of this function is driven by an
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open–mindedness parameter, σ , that defines how strongly agents rely on their perceived hierarchy among
agents to define someone else’s credibility. The higher the open–mindedness, the less sensitive the agent
is to the perceived position of other agents in gauging the agents’ credibility. In other words, the higher
one’s open–mindedness, the more equally influential the other agents are on one. Prior research on this
model has shown that, in a totally homogeneous population of agents having the same open–mindedness,
various types of hierarchies emerge and persist according to various simulation parameters (see Methods
for more details).
Based on the considerations in the preceding paragraph, we designed for our present study a Leviathan
model in which the agents are divided in two sets, one set, or “group” characterized by a small value of
the open–mindedness parameter (σS), which our arguments above suggest more characterizes men, and
another group with a larger value (σL), representing women. We test the hypothesis that this behavioral
difference among agents is sufficient to generate intergroup (gender) inequalities in terms of the average
esteem the population has for each agent in each group. Note that these predictions are not contingent
either on intergroup prejudice and discrimination, nor on agents categorizing the other agents as members
of the groups (for such models, see121). Further, we predict that the inequality that will emerge from our
model will do so regardless of other parameter choices.
The details of the influence-Leviathan model
In the Leviathan model each agent i is endowed with:
• a self esteem aii(t)
• a set of esteems about the other agents ai j(t)
We initialize the model with a set of N agents having all the self-esteems and all the esteems on the
others set to zero: ai j(0) = 0,∀(i, j) ∈ [1, ...,N]× [1, ...N].
The individuals interact in uniformly and randomly drawn pairs (i, j) and, at each encounter, they
try to influence each other on their respective values. We define one iteration, i.e. one time step as N/2
random pair interactions (each individual interacts 1 time on average during one iteration). To be more
precise, one iteration involves N/2 executions of the following steps:
• Choose randomly an agent i ∈ [1, ...,N]
• Choose randomly another agent j in the same group than
i with the probability 0.5, else in the other group
• In f luence(i, j)
• In f luence( j, i)
• Gossip(i, j)
• Gossip( j, i)
Each dyadic interaction involves two different processes: In f luence and Gossip. The In f luence(i, j)
process defines how the agent i changes her esteem on himself and on j, according to j’s influence. The
gossip process Gossip(i, j) defines how agent i changes her esteem on other k agents, according to j’s
esteem on these agents. The In f luence process is defined by the following equations:
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aii(t+1) = aii(t)+ pi j(t)
[
a ji(t)−aii(t)+Random(−δ ,δ )
]
ai j(t+1) = ai j(t)+ pi j(t)
[
a j j(t)−ai j(t)+Random(−δ ,δ )
]
The Gossip(i, j) process is the following. During an encounter, we suppose that agent j propagates to
i her esteems about k agents randomly chosen in the population, according to the process:
Repeat k times:
• Choose randomly z ∈ [0, ...,N] : z! = i, j
• aiz(t+1) = aiz(t)+ pi j(t)
[
a jz(t)−aiz(t)+Random(−δ ,δ )
]
The strength of the propagation of esteem, in both the influence and the gossip processes is ruled the
influence function pi j that implements the hypothesis that the more i perceives j as superior to herself,
then the more j is influential on i. It is a logistic function (with parameter σ ) of the difference between the
esteem of i about j (ai j) and the esteem i about self (aii):
pi j(t) =
1
1+ e−[ai j(t)−aii(t)]/σ
The influence function, pi j, tends to 1 when ai j−aii is close to the maximum possible distance between
i and j, namely when i evaluates j much more than himself. It tends to 0 when i values j lower than
herself. The open-mindedness parameter,σ defines the slope of the function close to ai j−aii = 0.
Figure 5 illustrates these tendencies. One can notice that when σ increases, becoming 3 for example
(in red), the difference of credibility pi j given to an agent j holds by an agent i in higher esteem (dotted
lines) compared to credibility pi j given to an agent j hold by an agent i in lower esteem (plain lines)
strongly decreases, but remains. This is why in our experimental design, we tested more small valuesσ
than larger values.
The parameter δ models the idea that an agent i has no direct access to the esteems of another one ( j)
and can misunderstand it. To take into account this difficulty, we consider the perception of the agent i
of the esteems of agent j as the value a j• plus a uniform noise drawn between -δ and +δ . This random
number corresponds to a systematic error that the agents make about the others’ esteems.
Finally, the previously presented model has 4 parameters (i.e. in this version, we keep the probability
of i to meet an j of another group to 0.5):
• the number of agents, N
• the open–mindedness parameter, that in the paper we associated to gender identities, σ
• the noise intensity δ
• the number of agents an agent talked about during a meeting, k
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Figure 5. Examples of credibilities (i.e. strength of the influence) given by an agent i to an agent interlocutor j
depending on the absolute perceived distance i between j and him-herself (on the x-axis), and the fact i hold j in
lower esteem (plain lines) or higher esteem (dotted lines), for σ = 0.1 (in blue), 0.5 (in orange), 1 (in green) and 3
(in red). We observe that the higher the perceived distance, the lower the credibility for j when held in lower esteem,
or the higher credibility for j when held in higher esteem. Moreover, the larger σ , the smaller the difference of given
credibility to j if he/she is held in low compared to high esteem.
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The simulation setup
We presume here that a population is composed of two different groups which are distinguished by their
open–mindedness. The group size can vary. Each group G is characterised by two values: the number of
agents of the group, NG, and the group’s open–mindedness σG. G take the values S or L, where
S stands for the group with a Small open–mindedness, σS and L stands for the group with a Large
one, σL. We vary the size of each group, maintaining a fixed total number of agents N = NS +NL. We
implement two possible relationship functions between the σS: f1 : σL = 1.5σS and f1 : σL = σS+0.1.
We ran the model assuming N = 40. In the first part of the results we consider the case where the agents
are equally divided into the groups (NS = ND = 20). In the last part, to test whether having majorities or
minorities of the more- and less open-minded groups changed the results, we tested the model, varying
groups’ sizes by 5 agents, NS = 0,5,10,15,20,25,30,35,40. We also vary σS: 0.03, 0.05,0.07, 0.1, 0.12,
0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.5, 1, 2 and 3. For each σS, two various σL are tested according to the laws
presented in the previous paragraph. Each simulation is replicated 50 times. The length of the simulations
and the frequency of the measures depends on the values of σS, the lower the longer the simulations to
ensure we capture indications about the properties of the stable dynamics. There lasts at minimum 500,000
iterations with a measure every 10,000 iterations.
We set the noise parameter δ = 0.2 and the gossip parameter k = 3, except for the study varying the
size of the groups presented in the previous paragraph for which k varies from 0 to 3 by step 1. We can
then ensure results are stable.
Indicators of the evolution and methodology for their analysis
In the Results section, we explain how the simulation results verified our micro dynamic hypotheses. To
enlighten our results, this subsection explains how various measures of inequality are derived and analyzed
from the model results.
In the first part of the Results section, we focus on outcomes that are derived from various ways
of aggregating the agents’ esteems for one another across the population. We define the reputation of
an agent as the average of the esteem accorded to this agent by all the other agents. The measure of
inter-group inequality in status is the variability among the average reputation across the population for
each group of actors. To understand within-group status differentiation, we define a variation coefficient
to index intra-group variability in self-esteem, namely, the standard deviation of the group’s agents’
self-esteems, divided by the group’s average self-esteem. Finally, we define the socially-consensual degree
of intra-group status differentiation as the standard deviation of that group’s agents’ reputations.
In the second part we delve into the individual dynamics and show that the model generates and
maintains a glass ceiling effect, shown in the level of access the agents in each group have to higher status
positions. We compare the structural results of our model’s individual dynamics with the properties of
glass ceiling effect dynamics precisely defined by67 as follows:
• A glass ceiling inequality represents a gender or racial difference that is not explained by other
job-relevant characteristics of the employee.
• A glass ceiling inequality represents a gender or racial [status] difference that is greater at higher
levels of an outcome than at lower levels of an outcome.
• A glass ceiling inequality represents a gender or racial inequality in the chances of advancement
into higher levels, not merely the proportions of each gender or race currently at those higher levels.
• A glass ceiling inequality represents a gender or racial inequality that increases over the course of
one’s career.
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The results section shows that difference in open–mindedness between men and women is sufficient to
generate gender inequality in prestige, and shows the properties of the glass ceiling effect listed above.
The social rank of any agent is the order of that agent’s reputation, when agents’ reputations are ordered
from best (highest) reputation (1) to worst (lowest) reputation (N). To test for the glass ceiling effect, as
defined by the preceding criteria, we will analyze the agents’ social rank at different time points of the
model’s history. We will first analyze the average ranking position. Second, we will study the probability
that a given rank position is occupied by an agent of the S–group (that has smaller open–mindedness,
namely simulated men) or by an agent of the L–group (that has larger open–mindedness, namely simulated
women). Finally, to test whether there is differential advancement of the two kinds of agents, we will
analyze the probability, for an agent with a given social rank, to progress, in future time points, to a higher
rank.
How to explain the observed behaviours of the agent-based model
0.0.1 Short state-of-the-art
Prior research on this model has shown that, in a totally homogeneous population of agents having the
same open–mindedness, various types of hierarchies emerge and persist according to other simulation
parameters109. However, the basic Leviathan model109 includes two micro-processes driving the change
of esteem of agents: (1) vanity implies on the one hand, that one agent flattered by another rewards the
other agent by increasing the esteem he/she has for her/him and on the other hand that one agent despised
by another punishes him/her by decreasing her/his esteem for her/him ; (2) influence between two agents
regards how high they hold themselves and others in esteem, based on the perceived difference of esteem
between them.
In this paper, we only focus on the second micro-process, the influence, which has been studied by65
and has been shown sufficient to explain the emergence and the persistence of different social orders in the
population. Indeed, from such a micro influence process between agents, several patterns of hierarchies
recur: (1) elite dominance, in which one or two leaders have a low esteem about all the other agents,
who have negative esteems about each other except about the leaders; (2) a crisis pattern, in which every
agent has a negative esteem about all others, including itself; (3) disorder, in which the agents have
different perceived hierarchies; (4) an elite hierarchy for which all agents share a similar esteem about
every other agent (called reputation), the reputations are widely spread between the hypothetical minimum
and maximum (-1 and +1), and there are more agents of low reputation than of high reputation. The elite
hierarchy model appears to be a classical stratification pattern with a wide base of low-prestige agents,
with the number of agents in each strata of prestige progressively shrinking with higher ranks. Moreover,
these four patterns exhibit different average signs of esteems, depending on whether agents gossip or not.
In absence of gossip, esteems, except in the crisis pattern, can be of both signs (i.e., positive or negative).
The hierarchy pattern is often composed from either positive and negative esteems, whereas the elite
dominance pattern shows almost only negative esteems.
It should be noted, even if it is not the purpose of the present paper, that our study shows that with
two types of agents having a different open-mindedness in the population, the only patterns of hierarchies
which emerge are Elite dominance or Elite hierarchy. These patterns are characterized by high similarity
between each agent’s self-esteem level and its reputation.
0.0.2 How gender inequality emerges from the agent-based model in our study
The workings of previous studies using a similar model can help us understand how this differentiation
emerges from the micro dynamics of our Leviathan model. The prior model65, 122 was composed by
a population of agents with the same degree of open-mindedness. We showed the influence function,
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Figure 6. Credibility given to an interlocutor for whom our esteem varies around our self-esteem by 0.1 for
different values of the open-mindedness σ ; for a variation of: -0.1 implying the interlocutor is held in lower esteem
(red square), or +0.1 implying the interlocutor is held is higher esteem (blue triangle).
coupled with the noise during communication, causes agents’ discussions increasing their self-esteems
progressively, especially when their open-mindedness is large. Moreover the influence dynamics showed
that agents not only became more positive about themselves, but also more negative towards others, due to
their sensitivity to fluctuations of opinions in the population66. Indeed, while every agent in our study
agrees, on average, on someone’s esteem, the noisy communications between agents make their esteems
slightly different from this average. The maximum intensity of this difference is informed by the value
of the noise parameter δ which is always small (i.e. 0.2 in our study). The sensitivity of an agent’s
self-esteem and esteem for others to the noise implying fluctuations of esteem, depends on the agent’s
level of open-mindedness. Indeed the lower this parameter is, the higher is the «positive ego-centric bias
»and the more negative is prejudice against other agents.
In the population studied in the present paper, we have a type of agents, men-like agents which listen
to others less since they are more positively biased for ego and negatively biased for others because of their
low open-mindedness. Thus, they perceive other agents more different from themselves than women-like
agents, less biased, do.
On the other hand, our two types of agents have a different open-mindedness. This difference leads
agents, for a same fluctuation of esteem (0.1 in the example of the Fig. 6) to give a very different credibility
to their interlocutor. Indeed, as shown in figure 6), one can observe than an agent with an open-mindedness
of 0.05 will give a credibility of 0.86 to an agent perceived higher than her/himself by 0.1, and a credibility
of 0.1 to an agent perceived lower than her/himself by 0.1. In contrast, an agent with an open-mindedness
of 3 will almost give the same credibility 0.5 to the interlocutor varying in esteem from -0.1 to 0.1.
This means that the noise received by the second agent will be considered in the same manner, whoever
the source. On the contrary, the small open-mindedness agent is highly sensitive to the noise coming
from someone held in higher esteem, but almost neglects the noise when it comes from a lower source.
Practically, it means that low open-mindedness agents who reach high social ranks hardly must be affected
by noisy communications. They are only sensitive to noise coming from people having higher social
ranks. Their self-esteem then becomes highly stable as they obtain higher ranks because the number of
18/25
agents they see as more credible than they is quite small at high ranks. On the contrary, women-like agents
who reach a high self-esteem by chance are less susceptible to keep their self-esteem high since they are
equally sensitive to the variations of what others say about them, whoever they are, lower or higher source.
Their self-esteems are thus lower than the one of men-like agents, and less stable.
To sum-up, this difference of stability for agents reaching intermediary rank of the social hierarchy
gives men-like agents more chance to benefit from interactions with other agents, especially women-like
agents which are less negatively biased toward them, to gain higher self-esteem. This same difference
disfavors women-like agents, who ultimately have stronger chances to lose high social rank and the related
high self-esteem. This is why we observe the differences of social ranks and chances to reach a higher
rank when the current rank is high enough (see part of the results dedicated to the glass ceiling effect).
This is also why we have globally observed, comparing our pure-gender populations to the mixed-gender
populations, that men-like agents benefit from the interaction with women-like agents while women-like
agents lose from it.
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